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REASON'S RAPPORT: 
PASCALIAN REFLECTIONS ON THE 
PERSUASIVENESS OF NATURAL THEOLOGY 
William D. Wood 
The widespread rejection of natural theology presents a serious problem for its 
adherents. In dialogue with Pascal, I explain why natural theology so often 
fails to persuade and suggest some ways in which it can become more persua-
sive. I argue that persuasiveness is a function of attractiveness and that attrac-
tiveness is a function of our rapport with a given attractive thing. Natural the-
ology thus ought to show people that they share rapport with God. In order 
to do this, however, it must become more imaginative, since we are strongly 
attracted to the products of our own imagination. I commend both Pascal's 
use of the form of the fragment and his artful rhetoric in the wager fragment, 
which I read as a fine example of imaginative natural theology. 
Natural theology is perhaps unique among methods of inquiry in that its 
most determined opponents are frequently found among those most com-
mitted to the truth of its conclusions. It is no surprise that avowed atheists 
scorn arguments that purport to demonstrate the existence of God. More 
interesting, however, are those committed Christian theists who also reject 
the project of natural theology.l Their number is legion. Indeed, it seems 
to be the case that not only are most opponents of nahlral theology theists, 
but also that most theists are opponents of natural theology. Theists 
oppose natural theology for a variety of reasons. Speaking very roughly, 
we may isolate three fronts of opposition. These three positions are logi-
cally distinct but mutually supportive, so it is not uncommon that a single 
theist (Karl Barth, for instance) affirms all three. 
First, some theists argue that natural theology is conceptually incoherent. 
They thereby agree with religious skeptics that there can be no successful 
arguments, or complex of arguments, that prove that God exists. Such the-
ists do not find this state-of-affairs troubling, however, because they 
believe that God's "existence" is of a sort that transcends logical or empiri-
cal demonstration. Second, other theists argue that the real problem with 
natural theology is that it is idolatrous. Such theists assert that knowledge 
of God comes only as a result of the free and sovereign revelation of God. 
On this account, any attempt to use human reason to compel God to reveal 
Godself is not just incoherent but positively sinful. Finally, a third group of 
theists claims that nahlral theology is, in point of fact, useless, irrespective 
of the previous two considerations. They ask: who are the arguments of 
natural theology for? Theists, being theists, won't need them. Atheists 
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simply won't find them convincing. To these opponents, the whole busi-
ness of natural theology seems like a species of intellectual vanity that is 
best avoided. 
On both philosophical and theological grounds, the first two of these 
positions seem quite wrong to me, but I will not argue against them here. 
Instead, I will simply assume that the project of natural theology broadly 
construed - the project of using unaided human reason to demonstrate the 
existence of God - is neither incoherent nor idolatrous.2 Even after this siz-
able assumption, however, the third objection to natural theology still 
seems to have real force. Has anyone ever become convinced of God's 
existence after mastering, say, Richard Swinburne's inductive arguments 
in favor of its Bayesian probability? Or after pondering the subtleties of the 
modal variant of the ontological argument? It is not unfair to say that nat-
ural theology seems spectacularly ill-equipped to carry out its own task, if 
part of that task is actually convincing people to believe in God. 
One figure who thought a great deal about the proper relationship of 
Christian faith and natural theology is Blaise Pascal. Pascal is frequently 
regarded as an opponent of natural theology and, indeed, we can easily 
find among his Pensees fragments that suggest that he would endorse all 
three of the theistic objections outlined above. Pascal's exact position on 
natural theology is difficult to determine, in part because of the very frag-
mentary character of the Pensees, and so it has been the subject of a great 
deal of scholarly attention. The dominant strain of scholarship claims that 
Pascal's religious fideism and epistemological anti-foundationalism lead 
him to reject any kind of natural theology. Other scholars, however, point 
to the role that evidential arguments and proofs play in the Pensees and 
argue that Pascal's rejection of natural theology is not as uncompromising 
as it first appears.3 For the most part, both groups of scholars seek to deter-
mine whether Pascal believes that natural theology is possible, on either 
philosophical or religious grounds. In other words, they focus on Pascal's 
treatment of what I am calling the first and second theistic objections to 
natural theology. They say comparatively little about the third objection, 
even though Pascal himself devotes a great deal of attention to it. 
In this paper I first argue that the fact that natural theology is widely 
rejected poses a serious problem for its adherents, committed as they are to 
the truth of its conclusions. I next suggest that in order to understand this 
widespread rejection, we should look first for an account of what makes 
things in general seem attractive. I argue, in dialogue with Pascal, that 
attractiveness is a function of our rapport with particular attractive things 
and that we do not find belief in God attractive because we seem to share 
no rapport with God. I further argue that it is the power of the imagina-
tion that makes things seem attractive and that we use our imaginations to 
create a beguiling but false self that seems to share no rapport with God. 
Thus, if natural theology would become more convincing, it must first seek 
to persuade people that they can (and do) share rapport with God. In 
order to do this, however, natural theology must itself become more imagi-
native and must pay greater attention to its literary and rhetorical form. I 
conclude by commending the form of the fragment as an appropriate form 
for natural theology and by offering a reading of Pascal's famous wager 
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fragment that highlights its attentiveness to the dynamics of rapport. 
Although I look to Pascal for inspiration at every turn, I must emphasize at 
the outset that mine is a constructive rather than a historical-exegetical 
interpretation of his thought. As a result, I draw from Pascal freely, com-
pletely neglecting some central elements of the Pensees (the heart and the 
three orders, for example) and elevating other seemingly obscure elements 
(especially the idea of rapport) to central importance. 
I. 
In this section, I argue that we Christians who believe that natural theology 
is a worthwhile endeavor face a special dilemma. By virtue of our belief in 
its worthiness, we must affirm either (1) that sound arguments concluding 
that God exists have already been discovered or (2) that, although they 
have not yet been discovered, such arguments are available in principle.4 
In the first case we must ask ourselves why these supposedly sound argu-
ments command such small respect from the community best equipped to 
evaluate them, philosophers and theologians. (We must also admit that 
the arguments of natural theology rarely lead laypeople to believe in God 
either.) The second case is trickier - certainly, we shouldn't rule out the 
discovery of some knock-down argument that silences all skeptics - but, 
apart from such an tiber-argument, it seems fair to say that the future will 
look much like the present, which is to say that future work in natural the-
ology will be widely regarded as suspect and unconvincing. Hence our 
dilemma: even when natural theology succeeds, it fails- because we can-
not convince anyone of its success. 
Note that I do not conflate an argument's soundness with its persuasive-
ness. I do not claim that all persuasive arguments are sound or that all 
sound arguments are persuasive. Neither do I conflate an argument's per-
suasiveness to experts with its persuasiveness to laypeople, nor suggest 
that the absence of the latter devalues the former. Nevertheless, it seems 
intuitively plausible that, at a minimum, a sound argument offered in good 
faith ought to be convincing to a large subset of those who are equipped to 
understand it. Yet such does not seem to be the case with natural theology. 
Of course, philosophers thoroughly disagree about basic questions of 
ontology, epistemology, etc., so perhaps we should not expect widespread 
agreement about the conclusions of natural theology. I suggest, however, 
that this line of defense is not really open to the Christian natural theolo-
gian. Technical philosophical positions about ontology, epistemology or 
whatnot are abstruse and widespread disagreement about them is just 
what we would expect. But the Christian natural theologian cannot legiti-
mately group arguments about the existence of God with these other tech-
nical disputes. For the Christian natural theologian (qua Christian) main-
tains that every human being was created by God and for God, and that 
every heart is restless until it rests in God. He should therefore expect that 
arguments about the existence of God would be more persuasive, not less 
persuasive, than other philosophical arguments. Our hearts aren't restless 
until they determine whether justified true belief really is knowledge, after 
all. If anything, the natural theologian ought to expect that philosophers 
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(indeed, all human beings) would have a cognitive bias ill favor of belief in 
God, not against it. 
It is also worth noting that certain traditional explanations are not open 
to the natural theologian (qua natural theologian) without heavy qualifica-
tion. For example, if a natural theologian appeals to the noetic effects of sin 
in order to explain why some putatively sound argument is not widely 
regarded as persuasive, then he must also be prepared to explain how, 
given the noetic effects of sin, he himself was able to recognize the sound-
ness of the argument. For if he needed a special infusion of grace or deep 
catechesis from the Christian community in order to recognize the sound-
ness of his own argument, then he must expect that others will need simi-
lar aids, a result that seems to undercut his belief that natural theology is a 
worthwhile endeavor. We might proceed similarly with respect to the doc-
trine of the hiddenness of God, another traditional explanation for why the 
arguments of natural theology fail. Presumably, God is hidden from the 
natural theologian no less than from the skeptic. In general, it seems that 
the natural theologian cannot regard human sinfulness or divine hidden-
ness as essential cognitive barriers to belief in the existence of God, and so 
she must regard them as barriers that can be overcome by adroit argument. 
To reiterate: the Christian natural theologian cannot affirm that there 
are barriers that, in principle, prevent the discovery of sound arguments 
that prove God's existence. Nor can she affirm that there are barriers that, 
in principle, prevent those arguments from being persuasive (else natural 
theology would not be worthwhile). So she believes, qua natural theolo-
gian, that there are (or can be) sound and persuasive arguments that 
demonstrate God's existence. But, given that every human being was cre-
ated by and for God, she ought also to believe that the background condi-
tions for assent to the conclusions of her arguments are more favorable, not 
less favorable, than the background conditions for assent to other disputed 
philosophical claims. Thus, the fact that her arguments do not command 
widespread assent is a real problem for the Christian natural theologian, 
one that cries out for explanation. 
II. 
In this section I develop an explanation, drawn from Pascal, for why natural 
theology so often fails to convince. The explanation that I propose can, I 
believe, account for the fact that the arguments of natural theology com-
mand little assent while nevertheless affirming its value as a worthwhile 
endeavor. To begin, let us first reformulate our question. Instead of asking 
why the arguments of natural theology are unpersuasive, let us ask instead 
why belief in God is not attractive. Having thus reformulated our question, 
we may ask another: what makes something, anything, attractive? I intend 
no sleight of hand here. This move is merely a step up in generality, a move 
from the more particular to the more general. Persuasiveness is a feature of 
arguments, but attractiveness is a feature of many things. Perhaps, by mov-
ing from talk about persuasiveness to talk about attractiveness, we can learn 
something about what makes an argument persuasive. 
Pascal writes that "there is a certain model of attractiveness and beauty 
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consisting in a certain relation [rapport] between our nature, weak or strong 
as it may be, and the thing which pleases us" (585).5 It is instructive that 
Pascal locates the source of attractiveness in the rapport between our nature 
and the particular attractive thing and not in the thing itself. '!he word "rap-
port" and its variants appear in some of the key fragments of the Pensees.6 
English editions of the Pensees usually translate "rapport" as "relationship" 
and "rapporter" as "to relate," and, indeed, these are the ordinary renderings 
of these words. The French word "rapport," however, has valences not 
quite captured by the English word "relationship." Whereas "relationship" 
is a neutral term, "rapport" connotes value. This was also true in Pascal's 
time: the relevant sub-section of one 17th century French dictionary begins 
its definition of "rapport" with "convenance," (fitness / propriety / seemliness) 
and continues with "resemblance" and "conformite" (resemblance and confor-
mity)? To say, for example, that there is "a rapport between man and all he 
knows" (199) is to say more than that some relationship obtains between the 
two. It is to say that the relationship that obtains is appropriate and that a 
man's knowledge befits his state as a finite human being. Similarly, it is not 
the case that there is no "relationship" between God and the human being 
(418). There is, Pascal would certainly affirm, at the minimum the relation-
ship of creator to creature. But, despite this relationship, the human being is 
not conformed to God, does not resemble God, and is not fitted to matters 
divine. We have no rapport with God. 
The notion of rapport is of special importance to the task of natural the-
ology. Adherents of natural theology typically try to offer arguments that 
God's existence is necessary, probable, or rationally affirmed. Pascal's 
great insight is that such arguments fail to address the deeper problem that 
is at the root of our unbelief. That deeper problem is the failure to find 
truths about God attractive, which is in tum rooted in our lack of rapport 
with God. The unbeliever does not find belief in God attractive because he 
has no way, given God's sheer difference, to relate the attractions of theistic 
belief to the attractions that he already accepts. On this understanding, the 
problem with natural theology is not that it is idolatrous or unsound, but 
that its conclusions are not attractive and are thus incapable of inciting 
belief. In other words, the failure of natural theology is not a failure of rea-
son, but a failure to be moved by reason. Pascal's comment in fragment 
190 is instructive: "'!he metaphysical proofs for the existence of God are so 
remote from human reasoning and so involved that they make little 
impact, and, even if they did help some people, it would only be for the 
moment during which they watched the demonstration, because an hour 
later they would be afraid they had made a mistake." Note that Pascal 
does not say that the proofs are false, and note that he assumes that it is 
possible that they could help some people. '!he problem is not with their 
soundness, but with the fact that their form (logical argumentation) is not 
suited to their content (truths about God) and thus can incite belief only for 
a short time, if at all. 
The arguments of natural theology are unpersuasive because belief in 
God is unattractive. In a shorter work called The Art of Persuasion, Pascal 
makes explicit the link between persuasiveness, attractiveness and rapport. 
He writes that when we wish to persuade someone of something: 
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we must take into consideration the person with whom we are con-
cerned, of whom we know the mind and heart, the principles admit-
ted, and the things loved; and then we must take note, in the matter 
concerned, the rapport it has with admitted truths or of the objects of 
delight through the charms we attribute to them.s 
This passage, along with fragment 585 (above) suggests that, according to 
Pascal, we are likely to regard a potential belief as attractive when we per-
ceive the appropriate rapport between ourselves as knowing subjects, our 
existing beliefs, and the potential belief in question. In other words, we are 
likely to be attracted to beliefs that fit in with, resemble, and conform to 
those beliefs we already have. We judge a potential belief attractive when 
it can be integrated easily into the structure of our already-held beliefs. 
Moreover, the perception of rapport - which we may here take as the per-
ception that a potential belief is easily integrated - produces a feeling of 
pleasure. This feeling of pleasure is the pleasure one feels in having the 
way one looks at the world· validated. If I perceive a rapport between a 
potential belief and my existing belief structure I experience a concomitant 
feeling of pleasure because every new belief successfully integrated into 
my structure ratifies the soundness of the structure as a whole and in so 
doing, ratifies me as a cognitive being. This cannot but be pleasurable. It 
follows, however, that belief formation is frequently a self-referential 
process and that we often engage with reality by determining the degree to 
which it conforms with what we already believe. 
III. 
This analysis of rapport suggests that if we want to make an argument per-
suasive, we should try to make the potential belief that is its conclusion 
attractive. As we seek to understand what makes a potential belief attrac-
tive, it is useful to contrast the true but unpersuasive arguments of natural 
theology to the beguiling but false products of the imagination. Pascal 
famously calls the imagination "the dominant faculty in man" and writes 
that "reason never wholly overcomes imagination, while the contrary is 
quite common" (44). He offers the following example: "Put the world's 
greatest philosopher on a plank that is wider than need be: if there is a 
precipice below, although his reason may convince him that he is safe, his 
imagination will prevail" (44). Elsewhere he writes that "Imagination 
magnifies small objects with fantastic exaggeration until they fill our soul, 
and with bold insolence cuts down great things to its own size ... " (551). 
Pascal's account of the imagination further explains how the conclusions of 
natural theology can seem unattractive in spite of their truth. One must 
not fail to note that the philosopher of fragment 44 recognizes the truth of 
his situation: his reason sees that he is safe, but it is unable to compel him 
to accept his own safety. Pascal suggests that reason cannot always com-
pel belief because we often shun the sober truths of our reason in favor of 
the empty forms of our imagination. 
We can see the most important manifestation of the imagination's power, 
however, when we examine its role in human self-understanding. 
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According to the previous analysis of rapport, we are attracted to things 
that fit in with, resemble, and conform to our natures, which is to say that 
what we find attractive depends on what sorts of creatures we are. On this 
understanding, if we want to explain why we don't find something (includ-
ing belief in God) attractive, we should look beyond the thing in question 
and focus on our nature, "weak or strong as it may be" (585). Two possible 
avenues open for us at this juncture and we could proceed down either 
while remaining faithful to the spirit of Pascal. We could take the idea of 
attractiveness as conformity to our natures in an unsparingly Augustinian 
sense and analyze our failure to find belief in God attractive in terms of the 
corruptions and limitations that have wrecked human nature. This avenue 
leads above all to fragment 308 on the three orders - body, mind, and chari-
ty - and the suggestion that the supernatural order of charity, inhabited by 
saints and oriented toward God, is simply incommensurable with the other 
two orders. On this avenue, since all reasoning and discourse necessarily 
remain trapped in the order of the intellect, we must wait for God's grace to 
carry us across the "infinitely more infinite distance" that separates it from 
the order of charity. But, for reasons that I have already suggested, this 
avenue is not open to the natural theolOgian without heavy qualification. 
On the other hand, we could recognize that Pascal offers multiple accounts 
of human nature in the Pensees , some of which imply that if we could only 
learn to see ourselves differently, we could make some progress in setting 
ourselves aright. It is this second avenue, which seems more fruitful for the 
project of natural theology, that I will pursue. 
This avenue begins with the recognition that if we are attracted to things 
that fit in with, resemble, and conform to our natures, and if we also have a 
false understanding of our natures, then we are likely to be attracted to false 
beliefs, beliefs that reinforce that false understanding. Conversely, we are 
unlikely to be attracted to beliefs - like the belief in God - that threaten to 
destabilize our false self-understanding. According to Pascal, such is our sit-
uation. Our attraction to the beautiful but empty forms of the imagination 
has led us to construct a "self" that is a mere figment of the imagination: 
We are not satisfied with the life we have in ourselves and our own 
being. We want to lead an imaginary life in the eyes of others, and so 
we try to make an impression. We strive constantly to embellish and 
preserve our imaginary being, and neglect the real one. And if we are 
calm, or generous, or loyal, we are anxious to have it known so that 
we can attach these virtues to our other existence; we prefer to detach 
them from our real self so as to unite them with the other (806). 
It is important to note that Pascal identifies a self that is anterior to the 
imaginary self (our "real self" and our flown being") and suggests that it 
constructs the imaginary self deliberately.9 But if we create our imaginary 
selves deliberately, then on some level we must be aware of their false-
hood, and so the imaginary self is best seen as the product of self-decep-
tion. Fragment 978 also addresses the imaginary self in similar terms: 
The nature of self-love and of this human self is to love only self and 
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consider only self. But what is it to do? It cannot prevent the object 
of its love from being full of faults and wretchedness ... it wants to be 
perfect and sees that it is full of imperfections ... it conceives a deadly 
hatred for the truth which rebukes it and convinces it of its faults. It 
would like to do away with this truth, and not being able to destroy it 
as such, it destroys it, as best it can, in the consciousness of itself and 
others ... 
The self tries to divert attention from its flaws by constructing "in the con-
sciousness of itself and others" an imaginary self, as described in 806. Yet 
here again the imaginary self does not completely obscure our knowledge 
of our true selves. The self "sees that it is full of imperfections" and it 
destroys the truth about its real being not completely, but only "as best it 
can." The imaginary self is best understood as a product of self-deception, 
but the very idea of self-deception implies that there is a part of the self 
that is not deceived, a part that still recognizes the truth.lO 
Two consequences for natural theology follow from this analysis of 
attractiveness, rapport, and the imaginary self. First, we may conclude that 
a false understanding of the human self underlies natural theology's failure 
to convince. We have a false understanding of our natures and this false 
understanding causes us to be attracted to things that fit in with, resemble, 
and conform to our (imaginary) natures. Conversely, we are not attracted 
to beliefs that threaten to undermine our false self-understandings. Belief in 
God is just such a belief, one that has the power to undermine drastically 
the beliefs that support our imaginary self-understandings. No one really 
wants this conceptual carnage and so we turn away from belief in God, 
which implies that we also turn away from natural theology's sound rea-
soning about God's existence. Second, because our attraction to our imagi-
nary selves does not completely efface our knowledge of our true selves, 
we can be made to recognize them. These two conclusions suggest that if a 
sound argument of natural theology is to claim the persuasiveness that it 
deserves, then it must go hand in hand with an attack on our false self-
understandings. An attack on our false self-understandings can pave the 
way for a recognition of our true selves, which do share rapport with God, 
and the recognition that we can (and do) share rapport with God is the first 
step in making belief in God seem attractive. 
In summary, Pascal criticizes traditional arguments for God's existence 
on the grounds that they are too remote from human experience and, hence, 
unattractive. At the same time, he also criticizes the imagination for its 
deceptive attractiveness. He also argues that our false self-understandings 
lead us to reject the possibility of rapport with God, which works against 
any effort to make belief in God attractive. This dynamic, in turn, makes 
the arguments of natural theology unpersuasive. Although Pascal sets the 
unattractive conclusions of natural theology against the attractive products 
of the imagination, the rich imagery of the Pensees and the skill with which 
Pascal uses it for his own apologetic task suggests that we would do well to 
regard natural theology and the imagination as complements rather than 
contraries. Even if the imagination can make the conclusions of our reason 
less attractive, it cannot overthrow our faculties of reason altogether. This 
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fact should lead us to search for ways to use and direct the imagination 
appropriately and not merely to bewail its power for ill. 
IV. 
We are at last in a position to chart a new and, hopefully, more successful 
course for natural theology. Successful argumentation in natural theology 
would recognize that a false understanding of the human self is what 
makes the arguments of natural theology seem unattractive and unpersua-
sive and so it would first attack that false self-understanding. It would 
thereby be attentive to the dynamics of rapport, which means that it would 
seek to render belief in God attractive by trying to show how rapport with 
God is not only possible but already actual. It would also harness the 
attractive forms produced by the imagination to natural theology'S own 
true claims. It would thus proceed with attention to rhetorical form as well 
as to philosophical rigor. What might such argumentation look like? Not 
surprisingly, we have no better example than that provided by Pascal. 
Whatever else natural theology may be, its tangible product, its end-
result, is a piece of discourse-- a piece of discourse that aims to persuade. 
As such, it is answerable to the standards of rhetoric and literary aesthetics. 
Consequently, when we evaluate an example of natural theology, we 
should pay close attention to its literary form and ask ourselves whether 
that form is appropriate, given its rhetorical aim - persuading someone 
that God exists. It may well be that the typical form of natural theology, 
inductive or deductive argumentation embedded in an academic paper, is 
frequently not the best one. Indeed, we natural theologians should have 
learned this lesson from one of our greatest opponents. It is surely no acci-
dent that perhaps the most devastating critique of natural theology is not 
presented as a treatise but as a dialogue, David Hume's Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion. If I am correct that the deductive argument is 
not always the best literary form for persuading someone that God exists, 
then natural theologians should be open to the idea of using other literary 
forms. To that end, I nominate the form of the fragment, a literary form 
that may seem scandalously unphilosophical, but one that Pascal and 
Friedrich Nietzsche, among others, used to great effect. 
It is likely that the fragmentary character of the collection we call the 
Pen sees is merely an accident of its unfinished status. Nevertheless, the 
form of the text we have is not without significance. There are, after all, 
other ways of composing a text than by jotting down a thousand disjointed 
thoughts on scraps of paper and imposing rudimentary classifications on 
only a few of them. That Pascal was composing his text in this way, in this 
form, entitles us to comment upon his choice. And, without question, the 
form of the fragment - the form without apparent form - is uniquely suit-
ed to Pascal's rhetorical purposes. 
The fragment is essentially open in a way that other literary styles are 
not.U The demand for form is the demand for limits and boundaries, and a 
fragmentary text, to a greater degree than any other kind of text, reveals 
the possibility of meaning that is not captured by expected forms. The 
fragment challenges the fixedness of all classification schemes and bound-
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aries, including the boundaries separating truth from falsehood. 
Deductive reasoning neatly divides reality into categories and necessarily 
culminates in final conclusions, and even dialectic tends toward a resolu-
tion of the tensions it creates. But the fragment, unlike deductive or dialec-
tical reasoning, fully embraces the emergence of seemingly contradictory 
truths. In so doing, it unsettles our reason and our fixed perspectives on 
reality. This unsettling is perhaps a necessary precursor to the forging of 
radically new perspectives and beliefs like the belief in God. As we read a 
series of fragments like those of the Pensees, we are constantly forced to 
shift from one perspective to another in a way that leads us to see that real-
ity is not exhausted by our own interpretations of it. Once we have recog-
nized this fact, we are far more open to affirming ideas that we previously 
would have scorned. I should be clear that I don't affirm, and I don't think 
that Pascal would affirm, that there really are absolutely contradictory 
truths. I am merely pointing out that the fragment, as a literary device that 
presents contradictions without resolving them, can lead us to be more 
open to the possibility that we have not been seeing the world correctly, 
surely a key step in any effort to persuade someone to adopt a belief to 
which he is not already inclined. 
Moreover, the reading of fragmentary texts can be an aesthetic experi-
ence characterized by sparks of insight and feelings of pleasure. These feel-
ings of pleasure allow the fragment to present in an attractive form (a form 
that appears uncreated, but is in fact highly artful) content that would oth-
erwise be rejected as alien. Consider fragment 210: "All men naturally hate 
each other. We have used concupiscence as best we can to make it serve the 
common good, but this is a mere sham and a false image of charity, for 
essentially it is just hate." I certainly disagree with the bald assertions that 
all men hate each other and the common good is a sham, but when I read 
these two sentences I cannot help feeling intrigued and wondering what 
Pascal means. In so wondering, I entertain the possibility of their truth and 
grant them a kind of surface plausibility that I might not have granted them 
if they were presented as parts of a deductive argument. When a reader 
reads a fragmentary text, she is captured by the aesthetic experience of the 
fragment. The fragment is able to bypasses our entrenched defenses and 
elicit rapport directly. It is therefore the literary form ideally suited to help-
ingthe reader entertain the possibility of rapport with God. 
v. 
We can see the power of the fragmentary form at work in natural theology 
when we examine the famous wager fragment as an example of artful and 
persuasive rhetoric, and not just as an example of probabilistic reasoning. As 
discussed above, Pascal criticizes traditional arguments for God's existence 
on the grounds that they are too remote from human experience and, hence, 
unattractive. At the same time, he criticizes the imagination for its often 
deceptive attractiveness. All ideal apologetic argument, therefore, would be 
one that harnesses the attractive forms produced by the imagination to the 
true claims of natural theology. Pascal presents just such an argument in 
fragment 418, the wager fragment, entitled "Infini-Rien" (infinity-nothing). 
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The literary character of the wager fragment is often overlooked. Indeed, 
it is instructive to compare the style of this fragment with that of most com-
mentaries on it. With its dialogic structure and its explicit appeals to the 
imagination, the wager fragment is a work of art that displays real dramatic 
tension. It is comprised of such elegantly written passages as: "At the far 
end of this infinite distance a coin is being spun which will come down 
heads or tails. How will you wager? Reason cannot make you choose 
either, reason cannot prove either wrong ... " A great deal of the philosophi-
cal commentary on the wager, by contrast, looks like this: "Suppose there is 
a matrix in which the betting options are Y and -Y (where Y is some being 
Pn exists and -Y is Pn does not exist) ... "12 Whatever the interest of such 
treatments, it seems fair to say that they neglect some important literary 
nuances of Pascal's text, nuances that (I suggest) are important to his argu-
ment. I cannot provide a comprehensive treatment of the literary, philo-
sophical, and theological themes of fragment 418 here.13 I can offer a brief 
analysis of certain overlooked aspects of it, aspects that underscore what I 
take to be its rhetorical goal: the fusion of natural theology and the imagi-
nation through the presentation of a drama of self-erasure. 
First, it is important to notice that the whole fragment is presented as a 
debate about the conditions of rapport. This is especially clear in the 
beginning. The fragment opens with an unbeliever asserting that we are 
essentially bodies, bound by "number, time, dimensions," and that there-
fore we can know finite things alone.14 The Christian immediately chal-
lenges this view: it cannot be the case that physical form determines what 
we are able to know because we are able to know the existence of the infi-
nite. The unbeliever rejoins: we are able to know the existence of the infi-
nite because it, like us, has extension, although without limits. But since 
God has neither extension nor limits, he continues, we cannot know the 
existence of God. At this point in the debate, the cognitive barrier between 
human beings and God lies in the fact that we, unlike God, "have exten-
sion." The unbeliever agrees that we can conceptualize limitlessness but 
only limitless extension. The Christian must undermine this idea if the 
unbeliever is to believe that God exists. I ' 
Second, the way he undermines it is little noted: the Christian under-
mines the unbeliever's concept of the self. If the self is without extension, 
then it can share rapport with a God without extension. The probabilistic 
sections of fragment 418 - regardless of their mathematical merits - deploy 
subtle linguistic tricks with the word "infinite" in order to undermine the 
unbeliever's preconception that the self is bound by the body's external 
form. The wager, as discussed, is set in a context that questions how infini-
ty is intelligible. Recall that the unbeliever initially identifies the self with 
"number, time, dimensions" and suggests that these qualities determine 
intelligibility. The Christian takes notions of infinity based on these con-
cepts and subtly leads the unbeliever toward a concept of infinity that he 
previously had not endorsed, that of infinite happiness. First, he takes the 
concept of infinite number, a concept the unbeliever accepts, and innocent-
ly slides from "an infinite number of chances" to "an infinity of infinitely 
happy life." The unbeliever doesn't object to this move. But what kind of 
being understands what "an infinity of infinitely happy life" is? Not one 
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that is strictly limited to rapport with things characterized by number, 
time, and dimension. Similarly, the Christian uses the phrase "infinite dis-
tance," another concept affirmed by the unbeliever, several times in quick 
succession before concluding with the phrase "infinite prize."16 But if the 
unbeliever can understand an infinite prize, especially if that infinite prize 
is an infinity of infinitely happy life, then he must be able to understand 
God, who is elsewhere identified with happiness (407). But if he can 
understand this concept of God, then he himself must not be the sort of 
being that he once thought. The probabilistic sections of fragment 418 do 
not convert the unbeliever, but demonstrate to him that the barriers to his 
belief come from his mistaken conceptions of the self. The unbeliever is so 
attached to "noxious pleasure, glory, and good living" that he identifies his 
true self with the body and then falsely concludes that his bodily existence 
makes God unintelligible to him. 
Third, if we pay close attention to Pascal's use of pronouns it becomes 
even more clear that the wager fragment recounts the drama of the erasure 
of the false self and its replacement with the true self. From the end of the 
preamble on rapport, when the dialogic structure of the fragment begins in 
earnest until his conversion, the unbeliever, and only the unbeliever, 
speaks with the pronoun "I." Moreover, every statement after he is asked, 
"how will you wager?" contains the word "1." Only after the unbeliever's 
conversion does the Christian begin using the first person pronoun, where-
as the unbeliever ~uddenly does not. Instead, curiously enough, the unbe-
liever exclaims, "O! ce discours me transporte, me ravit!" Krailsheimer trans-
lates this sentence as "How these words fill me with rapture and delight," 
but they are equally rendered "Oh, how this discourse transports me and 
carries me off!" I suggest that Pascal deliberately puts in play both mean-
ings of transporter and ravir in order to highlight the fact that the unbeliev-
er's lime," his false self, has been spirited away by the power of the 
Christian's argument. 
Though it may seem farfetched, we should take seriously the idea that 
Pascal used pronouns with polemical intent in this fragment. According to 
Pascal's contemporaries, he was keenly aware of his own use of first-per-
son pronouns, and he regarded the words ''1'' and "me" as antithetical to 
piety and civility.17 In this fragment, the false self of the unbeliever has been 
carried away and the Christian now feels free to say "1" because, according 
to Pascal, only the Christian is entitled to say "1"- the "I" of the true self, 
the self that, as the Christian says at the end of fragment 418, "submits its 
being" to God. This use of etre in the Christian's concluding statement 
recalls the self's "real being" (etre veritable) discussed in fragment 806. It 
also invites a richer interpretation of the Christian's preceding statement, 
"you will have wagered on something certain and infinite for which you 
have paid nothing."18 In truth, the unbeliever has paid with his false self, 
but that is indeed "nothing." 
Finally, we must note that the real target of Pascal's verbal machinations 
is not some fictional unbeliever, but the living person who reads his text. 
When we bear this fact in mind, we can see in fragment 418 the full force of 
Pascal's ability to impress literary artfulness into the service of natural theol-
ogy. By the very act of reading the fragment, we must first identify with the 
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unbeliever: as we read, we speak his "I" with our inner voices and we are 
addressed directly by the Christian as "you." As the Christian "1" replaces 
the unbeliever's "1," we, continuing to read, ~cannot help but participate in 
this move. By the time he puts the words "OJ ce discours me transporte, me 
ravitf" in our own mouths, Pascal has carried us a long way down a path we 
didn't even know we were on, the path to rapport with God. 
The wager fragment is a good example of the direction that natural the-
ology should take if it is to claim the esteem that rightfully belongs to it. It 
begins with an attack on our false self-understandings, which paves the 
way for the recognition that rapport with God is possible. It impresses the 
power of the imagination into the service of the true claims of natural the-
ology. In the wager fragment as elsewhere, Pascal presents philosophical 
arguments as aesthetic artifacts. We would do well to imitate him and 
deploy a splendid variety of literary forms in our arguments. If we do not, 
the prospects for natural theology will remain grim. It will inevitably step 
into the breach with a whisper instead of a shout, bearing a defaced reason 
as its only standard. 
Chicago, Illinois 
NOTES 
1. Although the project of natural theology may not assume any specifi-
cally Christian commitments, it is Christian natural theologians with whom I 
am primarily concerned in this essay. I suspect, however, that my argument 
applies equally to natural theologians of other monotheistic faiths. 
2. If the phrase "the existence of God" raises too many onto-theological 
hackles, the reader may feel free to substitute, e.g., "the reality of God." 
Similarly, when I speak of "demonstrating the existence of God," I intend this 
phrase to cover inductive as well as deductive arguments. 
3. See, e.g., Terence D. Cuneo "Combating the Noetic Effects of Sin: 
Pascal's Strategy for Natural Theology," Faith and Philosophy, 11 (1994), pp. 645-
662 and Daniel C. Fouke, "Argument in Pascal's Pensees," History of Philosophy 
Quarterly, 6 (1989) 57-68. 
4. I should be clear that I have in mind robust arguments offered in good 
faith, not pseudo-arguments like "If 7+5=12 then God exists ... " 
5. All citations given in the text in parentheses are from Blaise Pascal, 
Pensees, trans. AJ Krailsheimer (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), which uses 
the Lafuma numbering scheme. As much as possible, however, I leave the 
word "rapport" untranslated. 
6. For example, 199,298,308,418,733,826,919. 
7. Academie Francaise. Le dictionnaire de /'Academie francoise. Paris: 1694, 
p.281. 
8. Blaise Pascal, Pensees and Other Writings, trans. Honor Levi, (Oxford 
World's Classics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 195. 
9. That, I take it, is the force of all the active verbs he uses in 806 ( "we are 
not satisfied ... we want ... we try ... we strive ... we are anxious ... we prefer"). 
10. Of course, "the very idea of self-deception" is itself disputed by con-
temporary philosophers. My argument here depends not on some particular 
account of self-deception but on the idea that we can be led to recognize the 
truth about ourselves. 
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11. Much of what follows is a distillation of lectures on the fragment given 
by David Tracy from 1999-2001 at the University of Chicago Divinity School. 
12. Jeff Jordan, "The Many God's Objection," in Jeff Jordan, ed. Gambling on 
God: Essays on Pascal's Wager (Lanham, MD.: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 
1994), p. 104. I am being grossly unfair to Jordan, of course. The question of 
whether there are probabilistic arguments in favor of religious belief is a per-
fectly appropriate one. I merely wish to emphasize that there is more to frag-
ment 418 than betting matrices. 
13. The best literary analysis of the wager fragment that I have found is 
Bernard Howells, "The Interpretation of Pascal's 'Pari'," The Modern Language 
Review, 79 (1984), pp. 45-63. 
14. The wager fragment certainly turns into a dialogue between an unbe-
liever and a Christian, but it is difficult to say whether the fragment's opening 
section should also be understood as a dialogue. I believe that it should but 
my reading does not depend on it. It is certainly the case that the opening sec-
tion presents representative skeptical and Christian lines of argument. 
15. Most commentators claim that it is the rationality of believing in God, 
rather than the existence of God per se, that is at stake in the wager. I myself 
am not convinced that it makes sense to separate these questions, but in any 
case, the proposition that the wager concerns is: "Let us say, 'either God is, or 
he is not.'" 
16. I note for the record that these movements are found also in the original 
French, not just in translation. 
17. Antoine Arnauld, in the Port-Royal Logic, writes: "Pascal, who knew as 
much of genuine rhetoric as did any man ... maintained that a well-bred man 
ought to avoid mentioning himself even to the point of avoiding the words 'I' 
and 'me.' He was accustomed to saying that Christian piety annihilated the '1', 
while human civility concealed and suppressed the 'me.'" The Art of Thinking or 
The Port Royal Logic, section 20.6. In llie spirit of fairness, however, I should 
also note that the Pensees contain no fewer than 753 occurrences of je or j' and 
99 of moi, according to Hugh M. Davidson and Pierre H. Dube, A Concordance 
to Pascal's Pensees (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975). 
18. The verb is donner, not payer-literally, "you have given nothing" (vous 
n'avez rien donne). There is a significant difference between understanding this 
conclusion in terms of the language of gift instead of the language of payment. 
19. I would like to thank Franklin Gamwell, Karin Meyers, Richard 
Rosengarten, Lea Schweitz, Kathryn Tanner, and David Tracy for their com-
ments on a previous version of this paper. 
